Screening and advising by a venture capitalist with a time constraint by Dietz, Martin D.
 
 
 
Center for Financial Studies 
an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität  Taunusanlage 6  D-60329 Frankfurt am Main 
Tel: (+49)069/242941-0  Fax: (+49)069/242941-77  E-Mail: ifk@ifk-cfs.de  Internet: http://www.ifk-cfs.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 2003/48 
Screening and Advising by a Venture 
Capitalist with a Time Constraint 
Martin D. Dietz  
 
 
Center for Financial Studies 
an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität  Taunusanlage 6  D-60329 Frankfurt am Main 
Tel: (+49)069/242941-0  Fax: (+49)069/242941-77  E-Mail: ifk@ifk-cfs.de  Internet: http://www.ifk-cfs.de 
 
 
Center for Financial Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Center for Financial Studies is a nonprofit research organization, supported by an 
association of more than 120 banks, insurance companies, industrial corporations and 
public institutions. Established in 1968 and closely affiliated with the University of 
Frankfurt, it provides a strong link between the financial community and academia. 
The CFS Working Paper Series presents the result of scientific research on selected top-
ics in the field of money, banking and finance. The authors were either participants in 
the Center´s Research Fellow Program or members of one of the Center´s Research Pro-
jects. 
If you would like to know more about the Center for Financial Studies, please let us 
know of your interest. 
 
    
Prof. Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen  Prof. Volker Wieland, Ph.D. * I thank workshop participants at the University of St. Gallen and the Center for Financial Studies, 
Frankfurt/Main, Germany, ”Workshop on Venture Capital and New Markets”, for helpful comments. 
 
CFS Working Paper No. 2003/48 
Screening and Advising by a Venture Capitalist with a  
Time Constraint 
 
Martin D. Dietz 
University of St. Gallen (IFF-HSG) 
 
This version: November 24, 2003 
 
Abstract:  
This paper proposes an intertemporal model of venture capital investment with screening and 
advising where the venture capitalist’s time endowment is the scarce input factor. Screening 
improves the selection of firms receiving finance, advising allows firms to develop a 
marketable product, both have a variable intensity. 
In our setup, optimal linear contracts solves the moral hazard problem. Screening however 
asks for an entrepreneur wage and does not allow for upfront payments which would cause 
severe adverse selection. Project characteristics have implications for screening and advising 
intensity and the distribution of profits. Finally, we develop a formal version of the ”venture 
capital cycle” by extending the basic setup to a simple model of venture capital supply and 
demand. 
 
 
JEL classification: D82, G24, L19 
Keywords: Venture capital, market structure, product development 
 1 Introduction
In recent times Venture Capital has received signiﬁcant attention from politicians and
economists. A great amount of today’s blue chips like Apple Computers, Compaq, Federal
Express, Intel, Microsoft, Raychem and Sun received venture capital in their ﬁrst stages of
development. Although recent work has helped to shed light on some important aspects,
see Gompers and Lerner (1999), Gompers and Lerner (2001) and Kaplan and Str¨ omberg
(2001) for excellent summaries of the literature, many questions remain unresolved. Re-
cent theoretic papers deal with advising and the double sided moral hazard problem.
Selection issues and screening remain to be explored and analyzed. Consequently, predic-
tions for optimal contracting are typically based on moral hazard considerations alone.
This paper combines screening and advising activities using a notion of time invest-
ments by the venture capitalist into his portfolio ﬁrms. At least in recent years, venture
capital funds have successfully raised funds in excess of their investments, see EVCA
(2002). Some funds are not invested and were not invested even through the boom phase
in the late 90s, so that capital supply does not seem to be the scarce production factor
of the investment process. Recent research has then emphasized the special importance
of the venture capitalist. Given the severe informational asymmetries when ﬁnancing
start-up ﬁrms, the venture capitalist as a ﬁnancial intermediary needs a set of specialized
skills in order to be successful. He is highly involved in the selection of potential ventures
as well as in supporting the development of the ﬁrm afterwards. Many authors have then
recognized the number of venture capitalists as the critical resource of the investment
process, see Michelacci and Suarez (2002), Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) or Inderst
and M¨ uller (2003).
Following Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2001), we will be more speciﬁc in this paper and
argue that the time of venture capitalists is the scarcity. A variety of empirical work has
pronounced the importance of the time constraint, see e.g. Gorman and Sahlman (1989)
or Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2003). Gorman and Sahlman (1989) report that VCs rarely
1delegate tasks to their staﬀ member but invest signiﬁcant amounts of their own time in
their portfolio of ﬁrms. Time that is invested in one projects is missing in other ones. An
accurate management of personal evolvement and a focus on the most promising ventures
is then an essential task for a venture capitalist. Time investment in ventures typically
comes as selection eﬀort before contract signing or as advice following the investment:
• Venture capitalists are involved in the selection of promising ventures. Kaplan and
Str¨ omberg (2002) provide evidence on the high degree of screening eﬀort. The selec-
tion process is guided by a catalog of requirements deﬁning criterias of a venture that
is worth receiving ﬁnance. Walking through the diﬀerent requirements then allows
the venture capitalist to eliminate potentially bad investment proposals. Even if
screening is very intensive, some uncertainty will stay and ”can only be resolved by
going forward”(Gorman and Sahlman (1989, p. 238)). It is hard to foresee the com-
mercial consequences of new product introductions so that product market forces
will have to decide upon the usefulness of a business idea. While typical theoretical
models attach only a ﬁxed monetary cost to the screening process, it is obvious
that the productive input is the time that is invested in reading business propos-
als, evaluating market outlook etc. Although an essential aspect of the investment
process, screening has received only few attention in theoretical work where Ueda
(2002) and Gehrig and Stenbacka (2003) are noticeable exceptions. Both papers
however do not allow for diﬀerent intensities of screening and only emphasize the
cost characteristic of screening, a simpliﬁcation that omits the scarcity of venture
capitalists’ time.
• Working together with the entrepreneur, VCs also add value to the venture by
advising and monitoring the ﬁrm. A variety of theoretical papers has discussed
the interaction between the entrepreneur’s eﬀort and the venture capitalist’s advice.
The emerging double sided moral hazard problem has been analyzed in Repullo and
Suarez (1998), Schmidt (2002) and Casamatta (2003). Empirical studies provide
evidence of value added services. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and Kaplan and
2Str¨ omberg (2002) report on the various margins where venture capitalists improve
the management of the ﬁrm. According to Hellmann and Puri (2000) and Hellmann
and Puri (2002) the VC helps to improve the professionalization of the ﬁrm. VC
ﬁnanced ﬁrms are e.g. faster to bring their products to the market.
Hellmann and Puri (2000) ﬁnd that venture capital is used by Innovators, companies
that develop new procedures or new products and operate on new markets. Since there
is typically severe competition in innovative markets as many substitutable products are
being developed simultaneously, a ﬁrst mover will be able to capture a higher market share
and thus higher proﬁts from a product compared to a market launch later in time. If there
are many competing ﬁrms working on similar projects, then introducing a product late is
harmful since competitors already absorb a large market share. The marketing literature
has typically emphasized brand building as the driving force behind this eﬀect.1 For
industries like information technology and biotechnolgy that typically use venture capital,
we could add network building, standard setting or patenting as additional arguments for
the ﬁrst mover advantage. In line with this, empirical research shows a distinct decline
in market share for later entrants, see Robinson and Fornell (1985) and Urban, Carter,
Gaskin, and Mucha (1986). Brown and Lattin (1994) emphasize that the length of time in
the market provides additional advantage for a ﬁrst mover. Gorman and Sahlman (1989)
report that a ”delay in product development was the major cause of venture failure”(p.
239) besides management problems and was mentioned in more than 50% of all failure
cases. Firms operating in evolving industries will thus race to bring their product to the
market as soon as possible.
This paper is new in combining a continuous screening and advising decision by a
venture capitalist. Based on a model of venture capital investing with a focus on time
investments, we will be able to look at market structures following shocks on the demand
for venture capital. The paper has some similarities to Michelacci and Suarez (2002) who
1Schmalensee (1982) argues that a ﬁrst mover acquires a stock of users who have experienced the
quality of his product and can hardly be convinced to switch to new entrants.
3propose a search model of the market for venture capital. A venture capitalist monitors
one project at a time and thereby guarantees eﬀort provision by the entrepreneur. Given
this interrelationship, the venture moves to a mature state with a constant hazard rate.
A similar search approach is also used by Inderst and M¨ uller (2003). These authors
incorporate value adding services by the venture capitalist and consider implications of
market structures on contracting. Finally, Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) analyze the
determinants of VC’s portfolio composition. In their model, venture capitalists expand
or shrink the number of portfolio ﬁrms depending on the demand and supply for venture
capital. All previous papers omit a direct view on the scarce time of a venture capitalist.
In addition, the combination of a continuous decision between screening and advising has
not been analyzed before and results in interesting implication for contracts and market
structures.
The paper proceeds by ﬁrst considering a single investment process. Players and
project characteristics are introduced and the optimal outcome together with its impli-
cations for contracting and some comparative statics is determined. The following part
then considers a simple market environment for venture capital investment and analyses
the consequences of demand ﬂuctuations both for the long and short run.
2 An intertemporal model of screening and advising
We consider a partial equilibrium model of an economy with a market rate of return of
ρ = 0 and a common wage rate w > 0. Time is continuous. Two players are introduced
both of which are assumed risk neutral and maximizing their expected proﬁt. The general
setup follows the early literature on patent races2 similar to Michelacci and Suarez (2002).
Entrepreneurs have an idea for a risky venture but are fundless and thus need
external investments of I to develop their R&D results into a new product. Once the
2See e.g. Lucas, Jr. (1971), Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980).
4investment is done, the project moves into a development stage. Given commitment of the
players (to be deﬁned below), a ﬁnal product ready for market introduction then arrives
randomly at a hazard rate λ. There are two quality types of business ideas. Market
supply consists of good and bad ﬁrms in relative shares of x and 1 − x, respectively.
We assume that neither entrepreneur nor any outsider know the true type of a speciﬁc
project. Once a marketable product appears, market forces will decide upon its survival
and true quality is revealed. Bad projects fail and yield a liquidation value Q. Good
projects succeed when introduced at the market and return a payout in excess to the
liquidation value. We take the return payment as decreasing over time reﬂecting the
decrease in market potential over time. A good project then creates a value of R(t)+Q.
We will assume R(0) ≥ 0 and limt→∞ R(t) = 0 with R0(t) < 0 whenever R(t) > 0. This
declining formulation implements empirical and theoretical results discussed before. A
microeconomic foundation would be based on strategic interactions as in the literature on
patent races, but is beyond the scope of this paper. Payouts are ordered R(0)+Q > I > Q.
Venture capitalists are specialized ﬁnancial intermediaries. They have access to
the capital market and can raise funds at the market rate of return.3 In addition to the
provision of funds, they have two important core competencies: First, VCs have a deep
industry knowledge allowing them to judge the commercial potential of a business idea.
We will refer to this as the screening competency of a venture capitalist. Screening is
imperfect, its eﬀectiveness depends on the time invested in the screening process. We will
assume that the screening process is guided by a list of requirements with an arbitrary
level of accuracy. Good projects fulﬁll all requirements while bad projects fail to meet
the standards in a more or less subtle way. Walking through his list and digging deeper
into the details of the investment proposal, we thus assume that a venture capitalist can
eliminate bad projects at a rate µ so that investing screening time s reduces the share of
3This assumption allows us to abstract from two important points of venture capital investment.
First the relationship between the venture capitalist and portfolio investors and second the desinvestment
decision of the venture capitalist.
5bad projects to (1 − x)exp(−µs). We calculate the relative share of good projects after
screening as π (s) = x
x+(1−x)exp(−µs).
Second, venture capitalists have management knowledge and are experienced in build-
ing up a commercial infrastructure for infant ﬁrms and can thus improve the speed of
professionalization. We will call this advising the ﬁrm. We assume that product devel-
opment requests the joint evolvement of entrepreneur and venture capitalist in order to
succeed. Since the entrepreneur is commercially inexperienced, he needs external advice
a ∈ {0,1} by the venture capitalist in addition to his own eﬀort e ∈ {0,1}. At every
point in time there are thus digital decisions about the personal involvement of the play-
ers. Since we consider a model in continuous time, the time domain will allow for diﬀerent
intensities of the two input factors. We will take the extreme assumption that only the
joint eﬀort allows for product development at a rate of a·e·λ. Both entrepreneur and ven-
ture capitalist however face (opportunity) costs. Marginal costs of keeping the ﬁrm alive
during its development phase are thus the foregone, common wage of the entrepreneur
wEN plus eﬀort costs cEN and the venture capitalist’s foregone wage wV C and costs of
advising cV C.
The time line of a single venture capital investment is as follows: Entrepreneurs are
endowed with a business idea with unknown, but predetermined quality. Venture Cap-
italists announce a contract oﬀer specifying all ﬁnancial arrangements. Acceptance is
however contingent on successful screening.4 Entrepreneurs with a business idea then
apply for venture capital ﬁnance. During the following screening period, bad projects
will drop out at the hazard rate µ. Once screening is completed, investment takes place
and the period of advising starts. Productive input of both entrepreneur and venture
capitalist are unobservable. If both comply, a marketable product appears at a hazard
rate λ. Uncertainty is resolved after market introduction and payoﬀs are settled. At some
point in time, remaining projects might be liquidated. Screening and advising period are
4This timing circumvents the technical diﬃculties discussed in Gehrig and Stenbacka (2003) and
Broecker (1990).
6consecutive. Advising only starts once screening is ﬁnished and investments are done.
VC 
announces 
contract
(contingent on 
screening result)
Entrepreneur
accepts
VC 
screens 
project
VC 
invests I
Joint effort/advice
(Some) bad firms 
drop out
Liquidation
Marketable product: 
Uncertainty revealed
Nature chooses
quality
Figure 1: Time line of venture capital investment
A venture capitalist is only able to either screen or advise one project at a point in
time. Once he stops his involvement in a speciﬁc project, be it that the project fails in the
screening stage, succeeds to bring a project to the market or fails to develop a product and
is consequently terminated, the venture capitalist will start to look for a new investment
opportunity so that the investment process starts afresh. Arranging individual investment
projects back-to-back, the model thus describes a repeated, intertemporal venture capital
cycle. We will renew this interpretation when discussing market structures and now
continue to analyze a single project.
2.1 Productive impact of venture capital investment: Screening
and advising
We will solve the model moving backwards in time. We start by deriving the ﬁrst best
solution. In order to replicate the optimal outcome, we will then consider implications
for contracting in a decentralized version. We conclude this section with comparative
statics describing the impact of key project and industry parameters on real decisions
and contract parameters.
72.1.1 Advising
A successful product development is only possible if advice is provided. Since the proﬁt
of a successful market introduction declines over time, advice is most productive at the
beginning of the ﬁrm’s lifetime and has decreasing returns over time. Advising will then
stop at some time t∗ to be determined in the following. To keep things simple, we will
assume that the decline in market potential only starts when investments are undertaken
and the advising period starts.5
Integrating over time, we can now determine the expected payback of a venture
Pt (t∗,π) at some point in time 0 ≤ t ≤ t∗. Initial ﬁrm value P0 (t∗,π) will be espe-
cially important in the following.
Pt (t
∗,π) =
Z t∗
t
λexp(−λ(u − t)) · πR(u)du + Q (1)
We thus have that ﬁrm value increases with the provided advice
dPt(t∗,π)
dt∗ > 0 but
at a declining rate
d2Pt(t∗,π)
d(t∗)2 < 0. Since proﬁts from market introduction are bounded
R(t∗) ≤ R(u) ≤ R(t), we determine Pt (t∗,π) ≥ πR(t∗)[1 − exp(−λ(t∗ − t))] + Q.
The venture capitalist will face costs of advising and the entrepreneur has a forgone
wage. Total costs of managing the ﬁrm including eﬀort costs are then given as
C
Ad
t (t
∗) =
Z t∗
t
 
w
EN + c
EN + w
V C + c
V C
exp(−λu)du. (2)
Optimal advising solves the following maximization problem
max
t∗ Π(t
∗,π) = P0 (t
∗,π) − C
Ad
0 (t
∗) − I
FOC : λ · πR(t
∗) = w
EN + c
EN + w
V C + c
V C. (3)
Maturity arrives at a hazard rate λ. A project becoming mature after time t∗ succeeds
with probability π and generates a payout of R(t∗). Optimal advising thus equates
5This is a good approximation if the screening period is small compared to a later holding period.
Screening costs can nevertheless be big if only few ﬁrms pass the screening process so that a venture
capitalist has to screen repeatedly until he ﬁnds a potentially good investment.
8the marginal proﬁt of advice λ · πR(t∗) to its costs consisting of the joint evolvement
of the venture capitalist and entrepreneur. In general, only projects with λ · πR(0) >
wEN +cEN +wV C +cV C are worthwhile receiving at least some advice. All projects that
are worse would never receive advice and then would never be ﬁnanced at all.
2.1.2 Screening
Having determined optimal advising we can now move backwards in time and determine
optimal screening which takes the advising decision as given. Screening is assumed to be
continuous. For bad quality projects, the venture capitalist receives a perfect signal of
bad quality with a constant hazard rate and thus turns them down. Screening costs are
then given as
C
Sc (s
∗) =
Z s∗
0
 
w
V C + c
V C
[x + (1 − x)exp(−µu)]du. (4)
When screening for a time period of s∗, a fraction of x + (1 − x)exp(−µs∗) = x
π(s∗)
remains and will be ﬁnanced. We can calculate expected proﬁts and optimize with respect
to the screening intensity
max
s∗
x
π(s∗)
· Π(t
∗,π (s
∗)) − C
Sc (s
∗)
FOC : µ(1 − π (s
∗))

I − Q + C
Ad (t
∗)

= w
V C + c
V C. (5)
Notice
dΠ(t∗,π(s))
dt∗
dt∗
ds∗ = 0 by the envelope theorem,
dπ(s)
ds = µ(1 − π (s))π (s) and 1 −
π (s) =
(1−x)exp(−µs)
x+(1−x)exp(−µs).
Screening improves the average quality of the selection and thus allows to concentrate
investment and advice on good projects. At the margin, additional screening eliminates
a fraction µ out of the remaining share 1 − π (s) of bad quality projects. Eliminating
a project in the selection phase allows to save the risky investment I − Q and the joint
costs of advice CAd (t∗) both of which are lost investments for bad quality ventures.
Marginal costs of screening are given by the venture capitalists opportunity costs of time
9wV C + cV C. We request the screening period to be nonnegative. Screening takes place
whenever µ(1 − x)

I − Q + CAd (t∗)

> wV C + cV C and we will typically assume that
the condition is fulﬁlled. Venture capital ﬁnancing is proﬁtable if total surplus exceeds
aggregate costs, taking into account an optimal screening and advising decision.
x
π(s∗)
Π(t
∗,π (s
∗)) − C
Sc (s
∗) > 0
Since we deﬁned that no projects with good quality are turned down, a decline in the
screening process proves bad quality. We have assumed that entrepreneurs initially do
not know their true quality. A bad screening result thus informs them upon their quality
and should induce them not to try to receive investment funds again.
2.1.3 A decentralized solution with optimal contracting
Implementing the ﬁrst best outcome derived above in a decentralized setup requests all
agents to share proﬁts as well as costs associated with their decisions. Since we have
assumed only discrete values of eﬀort and advice, the model does not share the problem
of a budget breaker at the margin for a double sided moral hazard problem as analyzed by
Repullo and Suarez (1998) and Casamatta (2003). The intertemporal structure allows to
separate the incentive compatible allocation of proﬁts and the distribution of proﬁts for
early stages of product development. Intramarginal returns generated at the beginning of
the cooperation can be divided between the partners within some range without harming
either incentive constraint.
We can distinguish between three types of payments between the two partners: Flat
transfer payments, payments contingent on the existence of the cooperation and payments
contingent on project success where the later two can also change over time. We will
assume that neither screening eﬀort nor advising of the venture capitalist nor eﬀort of the
entrepreneur can be observed and thus contracted on. However, an entrepreneur cannot
earn his common wage some other place.
10Detering bad quality entrepreneurs During the screening process, all good projects
are selected meaning that projects failing the process receive a perfect signal of bad
quality. Since the signal is only observed by the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur
but not by the public, reapplication of failed entrepreneurs at diﬀerent venture capitalists
is possible. Since screening is imperfect, there is always a strictly positive probability for
any bad entrepreneur to receive ﬁnance for his project. Contracting then has to deter
this type of entrepreneur from applying. Formally we write a participation constraint for
an entrepreneur of bad quality. He receives a ﬁxed up-front payment T ≥ 0 and some
time dependent payment w(s) and has a foregone wage wEN. Knowing his bad quality
the entrepreneur will never provide eﬀort and the venture thus will never make it to the
mature state. In addition, the entrepreneur is always free to declare his bad quality and
leave the ﬁrm. Thus
¬PC
EN
bad : T +
Z t
0
w(s)ds ≤
Z t
0
w
ENds
has to hold to keep bad quality from joining the screening process. Using t = 0 we ﬁnd
T = 0. No up-front payments are allowed and in addition, the total liquidation value
has to go to the venture capitalist. The threat of bad quality entrepreneurs to join the
contract does however allow for wage payments up to the outside wage wEN.
Selection issues constitute a huge argument against any kind of ﬂat transfer or up-
front payment. A ﬁxed payment generates an incentive to apply for a contract and, once
accepted, to cash in the payment and to retract from any further provision of eﬀort. Al-
though many theoretical papers consider up-front payments, we are aware of no empirical
work indicating that up-front payments are actually used. Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2003)
on the contrary report that a venture capitalist typically holds liquidation cash ﬂow rights
in excess to his initial investments in order to make the entrepreneur’s compensation most
dependent on success. If contracts themselves are used as a sorting instrument as claimed
by Sahlman (1990), then payments have to be made contingent on performance alone and
may not allow bad entrepreneurs to generate proﬁts.
11VC’s screening decision We can then move to the venture capitalist’s screening deci-
sion itself. Optimal screening takes into account all costs invested in the risky part of the
venture, that is investments I−Q and foregone wages and eﬀort costs of entrepreneur and
venture capitalist see (5). While the venture capitalist naturally shares investment costs
and his own eﬀort and wage costs, costs of the entrepreneur are typically not internalized.
Since screening eliminates bad quality ventures, the screening decision in the central-
ized as well as in the decentralized version will only be encouraged by ﬁxed payments or
time depending payments. Payments made contingent on project success will never change
the venture capitalists incentives to screen. Given the additional constraint on payments
developed above, incorporating the lost wage of entrepreneurs into the screening decision
is possible by paying him a wage equal to his outside option.
Additional payments however are not possible so that screening will fall short of its
social optimal intensity by not considering the entrepreneurs lost eﬀort. The venture
capitalist will only bear all costs associated with the selection of goods ventures but only
receive part of the beneﬁts. It is hard to estimate the severity of the shortcoming. If one
believes that screening mainly serves to evade unproﬁtable investments I − Q, then the
ineﬃciency is small.
Joint commitment and the break up decision We can then move on to implement
ﬁrst best levels of advice and eﬀort and induce the ﬁrst best breakup time. Since we
have already argued that the total liquidation value has to go to the venture capitalist,
giving him a debt claim of (at least) Q, we now have to determine the distribution of the
risky return. We introduce a sharing rule giving f (R(t)) to the venture capitalist and
R(t) − f (R(t)) to the entrepreneur. It will prove suﬃcient to consider a contract with
only three simple components: debt, equity and a success premium for the entrepreneur.
The contract parameter are time invariant but given the payoﬀ structure of the project,
repayments to both agents potentially change over time. Debt D and success premium S
are diﬀerent versions of a ﬁxed payment contingent on project success whereas the equity
12contract α speciﬁes a sharing rule for the remaining rent. We request R(t∗)−D−S ≥ 0.
f (R(t)) = α[R(t) − D − S] + D
R(t) − f (R(t)) = (1 − α)[R(t) − D − S] + S
Notice that at time t∗ joint marginal proﬁts equal joint marginal costs. While costs
are constant over time, the marginal product declines so that costs will exceed proﬁts for
a later point in time. If renegotiation is possible then, any contract might be renegotiated
at time t∗ and the project would be liquidated. However, we can implement a contract
making both partners willing to liquidate at time t(s∗) without renegotiation. We request
PC
V C : λ · π f (R(t
∗)) − w
EN ≥ c
V C + w
V C (6)
PC
EN : λ · π [R(t
∗) − f (R(t
∗))] ≥ c
EN (7)
Adding both inequalities up and comparing their sum to (3) indicates that both conditions
are binding. For any equity share 0 < α < 1 marginal return declines with t so that both
players expect to make losses once they continue the venture beyond time t∗.
For times prior to t∗ we now deﬁne continuation values (given that advice and eﬀort are
provided) of Ft (t∗,π) and Gt (t∗,π) for venture capitalist and entrepreneur respectively.
Ft (t
∗,π) =
Z t∗
t
λexp(−λ(u − t))πf (R(u))du + Q
Gt (t
∗,π) = Pt (t
∗,π) − Ft (t
∗,π)
An entrepreneur providing advice assumes to receive the continuation value Gt (t∗,π).
When shirking at time t, he will postpone a potential realization of the project, so that the
continuation value changes to Gt (t∗,π) +
dGt(t∗,π)
dt . The potential beneﬁt from shirking
is a reduction in eﬀort costs where expected future costs summarize to C
Ad,EN
t (t∗) =
R t∗
t cEN exp(−λ(u − t))du. Shirking reduces eﬀort costs by
dC
Ad,EN
t (t∗)
dt = cEN exp(−λ(t∗−
t)) so that the the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint for all t ≤ t∗ is given as:
IC
EN : 0 ≥
dGt (t∗,π)
dt
+
dC
Ad,EN
t (t∗)
dt
=⇒ 0 ≥ (1 − α)λπ [R(t
∗) − R(t)]
13where we have used the binding participation constraint PCEN and the inequality Pt (t∗,π) ≥
πR(t∗)[1 − exp(−λ(t∗ − t))]+Q in the second line. The condition holds for every feasible
equity contract, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, since R(t∗)−R(t) ≤ 0. Intuitively, an entrepreneur will never
try to shirk since returns decline over time and he will participate (or at least not suﬀer)
from a higher return today by the equity stake. Since the venture capitalist only pays him
a wage equal to the common wage, the entrepreneur has no interest per se in extending
the life time of the ﬁrm.
A similar condition applies for the venture capitalist. While we assumed that an
entrepreneur cannot shirk in his venture and earn the common wage at some other place,
we allow the venture capitalist to invest his time somewhere else and receive his common
wage there. When shirking, he foregoes a potential realization but saves eﬀort costs, thus
IC
V C : 0 ≥
dFt (t∗,π)
dt
+ (w
V C + c
V C)exp(−λ(t
∗ − t))
=⇒ 0 ≥ αλπ [R(t
∗) − R(t)] − w
EN.
Again, a contract that fulﬁlls the participation constraint will also encourage the provision
of advice at earlier points in time.
Distribution of proﬁts There is a variety of diﬀerent contracts solving (6) and (7), the
realization that is chosen will depend on whether entrepreneur or venture capitalist have
market power. Since only marginal payouts at time t∗ are important to guarantee incentive
compatibility and break up, higher payouts at earlier stages can be freely distributed.
Figure 2 can be used to illustrate this: Payouts decline over time. The linear contract
will then allocate a declining (or at least non-decreasing) proﬁt to each player in case of a
success. Venture capitalist and entrepreneur are indiﬀerent at the break-up point and will
strictly prefer to provide eﬀort at earlier stages of the ﬁrm development. In order to incen-
tivize venture capitalist or entrepreneur, he will need a payment of wEN+cV C+wV C
πλ or cEN
πλ ,
respectively, in case of a success. Since the project return is higher for times t < t∗ than
the sum of the two, the excessive payout can be distributed freely between the two players,
see the gray area. The dotted line represents a possible linear sharing rule.
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Q+πR
t* 1/ν
Time t
Payout
cEN/(λπ)
(wVC+cVC+wEN)/(λπ)
Figure 2: Linear contract
In a competitive environment, a venture capitalist only earns his common wage wV C
and thus will break even and make no additional proﬁts.
Π
V C =
x
π(s∗)

F0 (t
∗,π) − I −
 
w
V C + w
EN + c
V C 1 − exp(−λt∗)
λ

− C
Sc (s
∗) = 0
The venture capitalist thus has to receive some of the intramarginal return to cover
risky investment costs I − Q as well as expected screening costs until a potentially good
project arrives. The entrepreneur receives a wage payment and, at least, a payment of
cEN
λ in case of success to induce eﬀort provision. All additional rents that he might receive
represent a reward for the development of the product.
The choice between debt, equity and success premium allows for a variety of equivalent
contracts. It is possible e.g. to use the ﬁxed payments to guaranty eﬀort and advice
provision D = wEN+cV C+wV C
πλ and S = cEN
πλ see (6) and (7). The equity component then
only serves as a sharing instrument for intramarginal returns.
152.2 Analysis of the model
We will now determine some comparative statics of the model using its centralized version
developed above. Optimal advising and screening obeys the two optimality constraints,
who jointly determine the screening and advising period. Determining the inﬂuence of
the exogenous parameter on the equilibrium thus requests to recognize the joint eﬀect on
both ﬁrst order conditions.
λ · π (s
∗)R(t
∗) = w
EN + c
EN + w
V C + c
V C
µ(1 − π (s
∗))

I − Q + C
Ad (t
∗)

= w
V C + c
V C
First of all, it is straightforward to see that screening and advising are complements.
Screening improves the selection and thus by (3) increases the marginal product of advice
inducing a higher advice. Anticipated, higher advice in turn increases the expected costs
of advising. Since screening is partly used to eliminate lost advising costs for bad ﬁrms,
higher advice will also increase the incentive for screening, see (5).
The intensity of screening and advising naturally depends on the (time) costs of the
venture capitalist. We calculate partial derivatives of both equations:
∂t∗
∂wV C =
1
λ · π (s∗)R(t∗)
< 0 (8)
∂π (s∗)
∂wV C = −
1 − µ(1 − π (s∗))
1−exp(−λt∗)
λ
µ[I − Q + CAd (t∗)]
< 0 (9)
If a venture capitalist has high opportunity costs of time, he is more impatient with
his portfolio ﬁrms, advises them shorter and liquidates them earlier given that they have
not yet succeeded in the commercialization of their business idea. A higher wage of the
venture capitalist also depresses screening intensity. The nominator of
∂π(s∗)
∂wV C is positive
by rearranging the optimality constraint. A higher wage then depresses the screening
eﬀort of a venture capitalist and will allow a higher number of bad quality ﬁrms to receive
ﬁnance. The venture capitalist is then willing to forego higher losses of investment funds
16and advice in order to save some of his precious time in the screening process. Since
screening and advising are complements, the two eﬀects will reinforce each other.
Consider now the degree of competitiveness of the project or the time pressure of
bringing the product to the market. In the following, we will take a simple linear spec-
iﬁcation of the decline, so that R(t) = R(0)(1 − νt) for t ≤ 1
ν and zero later on. The
variable ν is then interpreted as a measure of research competition. We determine:
∂t∗
∂ν
= −
t∗
ν
< 0
The time of advising naturally declines with the rate of competition. Since the market
potential reaches a low value much earlier, project are liquidated earlier. By the com-
plementarity of advice and screening, the screening period will decline as well. In an
industry environment with higher competition, market opportunities vanish faster. A
ﬁrm that misses to commercialize a product within a short window of opportunity will be
liquidated early reﬂecting the severe decline in proﬁts over time.
Quite obviously, the higher the risky investment costs I − Q the higher the venture
capitalists interest in screening ﬁrms and thus eliminating investments in bad projects.
∂π (s∗)
∂ (I − Q)
=
1 − π (s∗)
I − Q + CAd (t∗)
> 0
The ﬁrst order conditions ﬁx the share of good ﬁrms after screening π (s∗) and the
amount of advice t∗ as a consequence of external parameters. The screening time s∗ will
then be chosen in order to reach the average quality π (s∗) taking the initial composition
of ﬁrms x as given. Taking a total derivative of π (s∗) with respect to the initial share x
and the screening time s∗ we ﬁnd:
ds∗
dx
= −
1 − π (s∗)(1 − exp(−µs∗))
µ(1 − x)π (s∗)exp(−µs∗)
< 0 (10)
Since screening is used to eliminate bad projects, we ﬁnd that the screening intensity
declines with the share of good ﬁrms. Venture capitalists will screen most intensively
17when facing a bad selection of ﬁrms. Screening eventually becomes unattractive at all if
the initial selection is very good, see the discussion of (5). On the other extreme, screening
costs will deteriorate the total proﬁt from ﬁnancing a venture. If the selection is too bad,
screening costs would be signiﬁcant and project development becomes unattractive and
no projects will be ﬁnanced at all.
3 The venture capital industry
We will assume that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are numerous. In a competitive
equilibrium then, the market for venture capital will clear and neither excess demand,
entrepreneurs without ﬁnance, nor excess supply, venture capitalists without investment
opportunities, will emerge.6 If entrepreneurs can choose between a variety of diﬀerent
ﬁnanciers, then competition will guaranty a zero proﬁt condition for venture capitalists.
A venture capitalist will only break even and receive a compensation for his ﬁnancial and
time investment. Our model of the venture capital industry will now concentrate on time
as the scarce production factor and endogenize the venture capitalist’s wage wV C.
In a repeated investment cycle, venture capitalists will compare the proﬁtability of
continuing to work with an entrepreneur with their expected per time reward when ﬁ-
nancing a new one. They will decide to stop their screening or advising work if the
expected rent from continuation falls short of the compensation oﬀered by an alterna-
tive investment project, see (3) and (5). The opportunity costs wV C will thus determine
the amount of time invested in a single venture and provide a link between individual
investment projects and the market for venture capital.
As in Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) we take a short and a long run perspective.
6Inderst and M¨ uller (2003), Michelacci and Suarez (2002) or Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003) have
introduced a search friction between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in order to explain shifts in
the distribution of proﬁts between the players. Our approach will share many predictions of these papers
while relying on a diﬀerent line of arguing.
18In the long run, a venture capitalist’s wage payment in excess of the common wage rate
will attract additional entrants. Market entry will eliminate all subnormal proﬁts and
venture capitalists will then only earn the common wage rate wV C = w on their screening
and advising work. Since becoming a venture capitalist is a long and exhausting process
requesting an extensive learning phase and considerable eﬀort and investments, we take
the number of venture capitalists as ﬁxed in the short run. Adjustments in the number
of venture capitalists occur with a signiﬁcant lag so that they might earn a rent on the
scarce time endowment in the short run.
In the short run with a sticky number of venture capitalists, endogenous adjustments
will aﬀect the average time investment of a venture capitalist ¯ t. The opportunity costs of
time wV C are taken as given for a single investment project and contract parameter are
adjusted adequately.7 If wV C > w then entrepreneurs pay a higher price for a sought-
after time unit of screening or advising. A higher opportunity cost of time will induce the
venture capitalist to abort his screening and advising eﬀort early, see (3) and (5). Venture
capitalists thus reduce average investment into a single project and increase the frequency
of investing in new ventures. In the short run, the industry will balance a supply shortage
by an increase in the speed at which the venture capital cycle turns.
Consider a continuous ﬂow of N entrepreneurs meeting a number of M venture capi-
talists. In equilibrium, the market for venture capital clears. An equilibrium requests
N · ¯ t
 
w
V C
= M.
Notice that M
N

= ¯ t
 
wV C
describes the market tightness and is emphasized in papers
using a search approach. As argued above, the number of venture capitalists is endogenous
in the long run and his wage will equal the market wage MLR = N · ¯ t(w). In the short
run however, any change to market tightness has to be balanced by the average time
investment following a change in the distribution of proﬁts.
7An increase in the venture capitalist’s compensation requests a lower success premium or a higher
equity or debt stake.
19Depending on the opportunity costs, a typical project receives an average time in-
vestment ¯ t consisting of an expected screening time xs + (1 − x)
1−exp(−µs)
µ and advice of
1−exp(−¯ λt∗)
¯ λ where advice is conditioned on a positive screening result.
¯ t = xs
∗ + (1 − x)
1 − exp(−µs∗)
µ
+
x
π(s∗)
1 − exp(−λt∗)
λ
d¯ t
dwV C =
x
π(s∗)

1 − µ(1 − π (s))
1 − exp(−λt∗)
λ

ds
dwV C (11)
+
x
π(s∗)
exp(−λt
∗)
dt
dwV C
From (5) it follows that 1 − µ(1 − π (s))
1−exp(−λt∗)
λ > 0 holds for screening to take
place, so that we conclude d¯ t
dwV C < 0. The market price that equates demand and supply
will be the opportunity costs of the venture capitalist’s time investment wV C.
A shock on quantity of entrepreneurs We will ﬁrst consider a shock to the demand
for venture capital by an increase in the number of entrepreneurs N. In the short run this
will shift market tightness and average time investment towards lower values. We can
analyze the long and short run implications using ﬁgure 3. We plot supply and demand
for time investments of the venture capitalist. According to (11), the venture capitalist
stops screening and retracts from advising a venture earlier if his opportunity costs of
time are high. The demand curve ¯ t(wV C) for venture capital is downward sloping. As
argued before, the supply curve is vertical in the short run and horizontal in the long run.
The analysis starts from an initial long run equilibrium in A where venture capitalists
earn the market wage w. An increase in the number of entrepreneurs will shift market
tightness towards lower average time investment and, consequently, an excessive rent for
the venture capitalist wV C > w, see point B. A higher value of wV C will induce less
screening and thus result in a worse selection of ﬁrms receiving ﬁnance. That is, less bad
ﬁrms being eliminated in the screening process which in turn increases the share of ﬁrms
receiving ﬁnance and advice. Given a successful screening, venture capitalist will then be
more impatient with ﬁrms and stop advising earlier.
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Figure 3: Shock on the quantity of ventures
In the longer run, rents will attract additional individuals to become venture capi-
talists. The short run supply will move rightwards and the equilibrium moves along the
demand curve back to the initial long run equilibrium where venture proﬁts equal the
common wage rate and entering the venture capital market is no longer attractive. Since
the compensation of the venture capitalist declines, screening intensity will increase and
the average quality receiving ﬁnance will return to its initial value. Initial and ﬁnal equi-
librium will experience the same market tightness M
N and only diﬀer by the total amount
of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
Notice that following a drop in the amount of entrepreneurs, the wage rate will not
drop below the common wage rate if we allow venture capitalists to leave the market im-
mediately. Changes based on a decline in entrepreneurs will then take place immediately
and involve no transition processes. The equilibrium will remain at its long term value
depicted in point A.
A shock on quality Consider now an unanticipated shock to the average share of
good projects x applying for venture capital while leaving the total number of applicants
constant.
21The after screening quality π is ﬁxed by (3) and (5) and independent of the initial
probability x. A share of x
π of all new arriving projects will be ﬁnanced and the increase
in x thus increases the number of ﬁnanced ventures and tends to increase the total time
invested per applying ﬁrm. On the other side, an improvement in the initial selection will
reduce the venture capitalists incentives for screening and depress the screening intensity,
see (10). An improvement in quality has two opposing eﬀects on total time investments.
This is also seen formally:
d¯ t
dx
=
¯ t
x
−
1
µ

1
x
+
1 − π (1 − exp(−µs))
1 − π

(12)
There is a positive eﬀect
¯ t
x since more ventures are ﬁnanced and a negative eﬀect from
the depressed interest in screening, see the remaining part of the derivative. The sign of
the total eﬀect can not be made rigorous and obviously depends on the parameterization
of the model. Formally, assuming that µ is big, screening results arrive at a high rate
and screening time for an individual project is low compared to advising time. The right
hand side of (12) would be small and we would conclude d¯ t
dx > 0. On the other side, if one
sees the objective of a venture capitalist mainly in the selection stage of the investment
process, then improved initial quality will reduce the amount of VC time demanded. In
order to reach the quality π, screening intensity can be reduced and less time is invested.
The two opposing results seem to oﬀer formidable, testable predictions for empirical work
interested in the relative importance of a venture capitalists’ screening and advising.
Survey results of Gorman and Sahlman (1989) can be interpreted in line with the ﬁrst
view. They report that the management of the portfolio makes up about 60% of the time
of a venture capitalist indicating the high importance of advice.
Moving to our graphical interpretation, a change in quality alone leaves market tight-
ness M
N unchanged and shifts the demand representation ¯ t
 
wV C
. We graph the case of
d¯ t
dx > 0 only. An improvement in quality then shifts ¯ t to the right for every value of wV C.
We start in the long run equilibrium A where venture capitalists earn the common wage
rate w on their time investments. A change in quality is now assumed to shift the demand
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Figure 4: Shock on the average quality of ventures
curve of ventures to the right without changing the number of entrepreneurs or venture
capitalists. Since the short run market tightness is constant, increased demand for venture
capitalists’ time will increase their compensation but leave average investments constant,
see point B. The analysis undertaken above indicates that screening time declines and
advising increases, both in expected value terms, leaving average investment constant. As
time goes by, excessive rents will attract new market entry and shift market tightness to
the right. In the new long-run equilibrium C average investments of time have increased
and the wage is moved back to the common rate. The decline in wV C implies that both
screening and advising are intensiﬁed while the market moves towards the new long term
equilibrium.
4 Resume
This paper has tried to shed light on the allocation of time by a venture capitalist between
his two most important, time consuming duties: screening and advising. Both activities
turn out to be complements: A better selection due to a higher screening eﬀort increases
23the productivity of advice. Similarly, if advice is assumed to be high since it is highly
productive, then selection tends to be done more carefully since potential losses from bad
ﬁrms would be more harmful.
In the setup analyzed in this paper, agency problems can almost completely be elim-
inated using adequate contracting. The paper however derives important implications
for contracting that the literature concentrating on moral hazard only, seems to have
neglected. We ﬁnd that up-front payment cause severe adverse selection in the presence
of imperfect screening by attracting bad quality and deteriorating average quality of ap-
plicants. Knowing their bad quality this selection of entrepreneurs is only heading for
a payment not contingent on quality and would shirk afterwards. In order to induce
higher screening eﬀorts by the venture capitalist, we also request him to pay a wage to
the entrepreneur equivalent to his outside wage. In line with other work, we ﬁnd that
a liquidation value should go to the venture capitalist and should be covered by a debt
claim. The risky part of payouts is optimally distributed using a combination of debt,
equity and a success premium. Although we have restricted ourselves to simple linear
contracts alone, ﬁnancial contracting can not only induce optimal eﬀort and advice over
time and an optimal break-up time but also allows for diﬀerent allocations of proﬁts.
The supply and demand for venture capital turns out to be an important determinant
of both screening and advice. If venture capitalists maximize their proﬁts in a repeated
”venture capital cycle” then an increase in demand will raise their opportunity cost of
time and induce both less screening and less advising. This will make the venture capital
cycle turn faster in order to cope with the high amount of potential ﬁrms. In the long
run then, new venture capitalists will enter the market and compete away the too high
time compensation of established venture capitalists.
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